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Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) differentiate between moral and immoral actors
Katherine E. Ford and Ellen E. Furlong
Department of Psychology, Illinois Wesleyan University
Introduction
• The origin of morality has been a topic of debate since 
at least the 15th century. The Hobbesian (1651) view 
argues that morality derives from culture, while the 
Rousseauvian (1763) view argues that morality is 
innate. 
• This debate continues, but recent work supports the 
Rousseauvian innateness view, including: 
• The universality of moral traits such as the tendency 
to do no harm (Foot, 1967)
• Evidence of moral behavior in preverbal infants 
(Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007, Hamlin, 2013)
• Evidence of moral behavior in animals such as rats, 
monkeys and elephants including prosocial behavior, 
avoiding causing harm to another, and accepting a 
small reward in return for giving another a large 
reward (Wechlin et al., 1964, Bartal, Decety & Mason, 
2011, Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008)
• However, while we know animals exhibit ‘moral’ 
behaviors, do they have the same moral intuitions 
shared by humans? 
Discussion & Implications
• Preliminary data suggests that domestic dogs may discern between a moral 
and immoral actor
• These results provide support for the innate morality theory, and specifically 
the existence of moral intuition or behavior in non-human animals
• Further research is necessary to determine if domestic dogs are truly 
capable of morals, or solely moral behavior
• As continuing evidence for animal moral behavior is discovered, researchers 
must question whether morality is uniquely human and whether animals are 
more psychologically advanced than previously thought
The Present Study
• Domestic dogs have not been extensively tested for moral 
behavior, but seem capable of exhibiting these behaviors
• Dogs have superior social skills when interacting with their own or 
other species
• Domestic dogs can pick up social cues and perceive the goals of 
human actions (Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta & Prato-Previde, 2014; 
Stauch, et al, 2015)
• Therefore, we hypothesize that dogs will use moral-based 
influence when watching a neutral actor interact with a moral and 
immoral actor.
• To test this we replicated Hamlin & Wynn’s (2011) with preverbal 
infants.
Method
• Subjects
• Domestic dogs of all ages, multiple breeds, 
male and female
• Recruited on a volunteer basis with owner’s 
permission
• Subjects were tested at an on-site laboratory at 
IWU and at a nearby pet daycare in 
Bloomington, IL
Immoral Actor
Moral Actor
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Results
• If dogs prefer the moral actor to the immoral actor, they         
should look longer at the former. 
• Though we do not yet have enough statistical power to         
detect differences (Immoral: n = 6; Moral: n = 11) preliminary 
analyses support this pattern
